How Scrona Chose Their Market: Team DNA Over TAM Analysis

Learn how Scrona CEO Patrick Heissler chose semiconductors and displays not by analyzing TAM, but by identifying where the team’s existing networks and industry knowledge created unfair advantages for market entry.

Written By: Brett

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How Scrona Chose Their Market: Team DNA Over TAM Analysis

How Scrona Chose Their Market: Team DNA Over TAM Analysis

Most platform technology founders start with spreadsheets. They calculate total addressable market sizes, compare growth rates across industries, and build elaborate models showing which sectors offer the biggest opportunity. Then they try to break into markets where they have no relationships, no domain expertise, and no credibility.

Patrick Heissler did the opposite.

In a recent episode of Category Visionaries, Patrick Heissler, CEO of Scrona, a high-resolution printing platform that’s raised $15.5 million, explained how the company selected their initial markets. His approach inverts the standard methodology and reveals why unfair advantages matter more than market size for early-stage companies.

The Platform Technology Opportunity Paradox

Scrona’s printing platform had legitimate applications across multiple industries. The technology could print at micrometer scale with extraordinary precision, opening opportunities in semiconductors, displays, life sciences, consumer electronics, automotive, and more.

Patrick described the scope: “As a platform technology, we also are looking at life science application, for example, microfluidic applications, lab on a chip applications we’re looking at now consumer tech applications, printing antenna structures, for example. On variables where substrates are getting more complex or more sensitive, where you have topography like curved substrates. So we’re looking at all of these things.”

Every industry represented a genuine opportunity. Every application had clear value propositions. This abundance of options creates paralysis. Which market do you enter first? Where do you focus limited resources? How do you avoid fragmenting your team across too many initiatives?

Most founders respond by building TAM models. Patrick started somewhere else entirely.

The Team DNA Question

Patrick’s market selection process began with a fundamentally different question: Where does our team already have unfair advantages?

“For us, it was quite clear that this technology enables a lot of value for customers in the semiconductor space, also in the display space, which are maybe the two markets and industries that we’re closest to, because we are coming out of this kind of semiconductor, like we as a team are coming out of this semiconductor ecosystem,” Patrick explained.

The logic wasn’t about market size. It was about existing capabilities: “So we know these companies, we know these supply chains, we have a lot of contacts, and this makes it quite easy for us to Attract it.”

This approach flips traditional market selection on its head. Instead of identifying the biggest addressable markets and then trying to build expertise and relationships, Patrick started with existing expertise and relationships, then identified where those assets created competitive advantages.

Why Unfair Advantages Trump Market Size

The traditional approach to market selection optimizes for opportunity size. Find the biggest TAM, model the growth trajectory, calculate what percentage you need to capture to build a venture-scale business. It’s analytically rigorous. It looks great in pitch decks. And it often leads to expensive failures.

The problem: large markets attract competition. Breaking into industries where you have no relationships requires expensive customer acquisition. Building credibility in domains where you lack expertise takes years. Convincing supply chains to adopt new technologies when you don’t understand their economics creates endless friction.

Patrick’s approach optimizes for speed to revenue and cost of customer acquisition. By starting where the team already has networks, domain knowledge, and credibility, Scrona dramatically reduced the friction of early market entry.

The tactical advantages are concrete. When you know the companies in an ecosystem, you’re not cold calling. You’re activating existing relationships. When you understand supply chains, you know which companies have purchasing power and influence. When you have domain expertise, customers trust that you understand their problems.

The Ecosystem Knowledge Advantage

Patrick’s emphasis on coming “out of this semiconductor ecosystem” reveals the specific advantage that made semiconductors and displays the obvious starting point. It wasn’t just that team members had worked in those industries. It was that they understood the ecosystem dynamics.

“We know these companies, we know these supply chains, we have a lot of contacts,” Patrick said. Each element matters:

Knowing the companies means understanding who makes purchasing decisions, who influences technology adoption, and who has the budget and mandate to try new approaches.

Knowing the supply chains means understanding how value flows, where resistance to new technologies emerges, and which players have the power to pull innovations through upstream suppliers.

Having contacts means being able to reach decision-makers directly, get honest feedback on product-market fit, and move from introduction to pilot programs without the lengthy credibility-building that cold outreach requires.

The Cost Structure Implications

This approach to market selection fundamentally changes the economics of customer acquisition. When you’re activating existing networks rather than building new ones, your CAC drops dramatically. When you have domain credibility, sales cycles compress. When you understand ecosystem dynamics, you know which customers to target and which opportunities are distractions.

For early-stage companies with limited runway, these economics matter more than TAM. A $10 billion market where it costs $500K and 18 months to acquire each customer is worse than a $1 billion market where existing relationships let you close deals in 3 months for $50K in acquisition costs.

Patrick understood this intuitively. By focusing on semiconductors and displays where the team had unfair advantages, Scrona could move faster and more efficiently than if they’d chased larger markets where they’d need to build everything from scratch.

The Multi-Market Platform Question

This raises an obvious question: if you have a platform technology with applications across multiple industries, aren’t you leaving opportunity on the table by focusing narrowly?

Patrick’s answer reveals sophisticated strategic thinking. Scrona didn’t abandon other markets. They sequenced them. “The major point that we have to tackle now is solve a problem for a customer, create value for a customer, because that will facilitate the adoption of our technology into this supply chain,” he explained.

The logic: prove the technology in markets where you have advantages. Build reference customers. Demonstrate that the platform works at industrial scale. Then use that credibility to expand into adjacent markets where you’re starting from a stronger position.

Patrick’s three to five year vision makes this sequencing explicit. After achieving mass adoption in semiconductors and displays starting in 2026-2027, “this will help us to actually internationalize the company and also help us to diversify into new fields. As I said at the beginning, we’re not stopping at semiconductor or display industry. We’re looking at life science applications and many more applications, automotive, consumer electronics.”

The initial market focus wasn’t abandoning platform potential. It was building the foundation that would enable platform expansion from a position of strength rather than starting multiple markets simultaneously from positions of weakness.

The Tactical Implementation Framework

Patrick’s approach suggests a framework for market selection that other platform technology founders can adapt:

First, inventory your team’s ecosystem knowledge. Where have team members worked? Which industries do they understand deeply? Which supply chains are they familiar with? Which companies can they reach directly?

Second, map those ecosystems to your technology capabilities. Where does your platform create clear value for industries where you have existing advantages?

Third, evaluate market entry friction rather than market size. In which markets can you move fastest because of existing relationships? Where does your domain knowledge create credibility that accelerates sales cycles?

Fourth, choose the market where unfair advantages are strongest, even if TAM is smaller than alternatives. Optimize for speed to first revenue and cost of customer acquisition, not eventual market size.

Fifth, sequence additional markets based on how initial success creates credibility. Which adjacent industries will care that you’ve succeeded in your first market? How does proving the technology in one ecosystem make expansion easier?

The Underlying Principle

Patrick’s market selection strategy reveals a principle that applies beyond Scrona: for early-stage companies, unfair advantages in market entry matter more than market opportunity size.

Large TAMs don’t matter if you can’t efficiently acquire customers. Growth projections don’t matter if you’re burning through runway building credibility from scratch. Multi-market potential doesn’t matter if you fragment focus before proving the technology anywhere.

Start where your team has existing networks, domain expertise, and ecosystem knowledge. Move fast to first revenue by activating advantages rather than building everything new. Use initial success to fund and enable expansion into markets where you’re starting from positions of strength.

The spreadsheet approach to market selection optimizes for pitch decks. Patrick’s approach optimizes for survival and sustainable growth. For founders with breakthrough technology and limited runway, that distinction determines who builds lasting companies versus who burns through capital chasing opportunities they can’t efficiently capture.