Epitel’s Multi-Stakeholder Sales Strategy: Selling the Same Product Two Different Ways

Epitel’s Multi-Stakeholder Sales Strategy: Selling the Same Product Two Different Ways

One product. Two markets. Completely different stakeholder maps, buying processes, and proof points required. Welcome to multi-use-case B2B sales, where your enterprise playbook breaks down the moment you try to apply it to your second market.

In a recent episode of Category Visionaries, Mark Lehmkuhle, CEO and Founder of Epitel, a brain health technology platform that’s raised over $20 million, revealed the complexity of commercializing a medical device that serves hospitals and outpatient centers—markets that look similar from 30,000 feet but require fundamentally different sales approaches. Four weeks into commercial launch, Mark’s biggest challenge isn’t the technology; it’s proving the complete commercial motion works across both stakeholder maps simultaneously.

The Deceptively Simple Product

Epitel’s technology appears straightforward: four wireless EEG sensors that attach to the forehead and behind the ear, transmitting brain activity data to the cloud where AI flags potential seizures for neurologist review. Clean, elegant, technically impressive.

But this single product serves two fundamentally different use cases with distinct stakeholder maps, buying processes, and value propositions.

In hospitals, it’s about diagnostic speed. “Someone comes into the emergency department, they had a spell, you know what was going on. You know, it could have been a seizure. Or grandma comes in with altered mental status, not sure what’s going on with her. Is she having seizures or is it something else?” Mark explains. The use case is point-of-care diagnosis—getting answers in minutes or hours to guide immediate treatment decisions.

Outside hospitals, it’s about event capture. The traditional three-day wired EEG gives patients “a wrap of gauze around your head. It’s coming down to an old school recorder that looks like a vhs tape deck, and you got to wear that for three days. And you can’t shower or anything like that. But your chances of actually capturing an event, like in your case, is very low,” Mark notes. Epitel enables monitoring beyond three days—currently cleared for up to 30 days—which “drastically improves your probability of capturing these events.”

Same technology. Different time horizons, different clinical contexts, different buyer needs.

The Straightforward Sale

The outpatient sale is relatively simple, at least by medical device standards. “If it’s an outpatient ambulatory center, we’re selling directly to the neurologist,” Mark explains. It’s a prescription-based model where the neurologist orders the test, Epitel handles the monitoring and AI triage, and the neurologist reviews flagged events.

The stakeholder map is clean: convince the neurologist of clinical utility, prove insurance reimbursement works, demonstrate patient tolerance and satisfaction. One primary decision-maker, one value proposition, one sales motion.

This doesn’t mean it’s easy—medical device sales never are—but it’s conceptually straightforward. You’re selling to a single decision-maker who understands the clinical problem, can see the value proposition, and has authority to prescribe the test.

The Complex Enterprise Sale

The hospital sale is an entirely different animal. “If it’s the emergency department, docs, their nurses, ultimately a neurologist is involved who’s reviewing the data. We need to show the value proposition to the hospital itself. So it’s a little bit, there’s more stakeholders for sure on the hospital side,” Mark acknowledges.

This creates a multi-stakeholder maze where each player evaluates Epitel through a different lens:

Emergency department physicians need diagnostic utility. Does this give me answers faster than waiting for a neurology consult? Does it change my treatment decisions?

Nurses need operational simplicity. Can I apply these sensors quickly? Is it easier than the traditional wired EEG setup? Will patients tolerate wearing them?

Neurologists need clinical confidence. Can I trust the AI flagging? Does this data quality match traditional EEG? Will this help me make better diagnoses?

Hospital administrators need economic justification. What’s the reimbursement pathway? How does this impact length of stay? What’s the total cost compared to current approaches?

Each stakeholder has veto power. If ER docs love it but nurses find it operationally burdensome, it won’t get adopted. If clinical value is clear but reimbursement is uncertain, administrators won’t approve purchase. Every stakeholder must see value through their specific lens.

The Internal Champion Advantage

Epitel has one structural advantage that bridges these markets: “There is some overlap,” Mark notes, because “oftentimes those neurologists are also working in the hospital.” A neurologist who prescribes Epitel for outpatient monitoring and sees good results becomes an internal champion for hospital adoption.

This overlap creates credibility transfer. When an ER doc considers trying Epitel, having a trusted neurology colleague vouch for the technology matters more than any sales pitch. The outpatient prescription relationship becomes the foundation for hospital enterprise sales.

This suggests a deliberate sequencing strategy: prove value in the simpler outpatient sale first, build neurologist champions who understand the technology, then leverage those relationships to navigate the more complex hospital stakeholder map.

The Proof Points That Actually Matter

After 15 years of development, Mark is laser-focused on proving specific commercial proof points across both markets. “We need to demonstrate that doctors want it, they’re buying it, they’re getting reimbursed for it through traditional channels, and they’re rebuying it,” he explains.

The reorder metric is particularly crucial. Initial adoption proves doctors are willing to try the technology. Reorders prove it actually works—that patients tolerate it, results are clinically useful, and the complete commercial cycle functions as designed.

“If their patients are enjoying this much more than a traditional wired EEG,” then the value proposition extends beyond the physician to include patient satisfaction. In medical devices, patient experience drives physician adoption more than founders often realize.

The Geographic Concentration Strategy

With limited Series A resources, Epitel can’t simultaneously prove both stakeholder maps work across broad geography. Mark’s approach: concentrate on two markets to prove everything works before scaling.

“Here’s what we can do in two geographical locations with these very limited resources. Now we’re fundraising again for our series B, what we’re calling our series B, to really then scale this nationally. So here’s what we can do on a national level,” Mark explains.

This concentration serves multiple purposes. It proves the complete commercial motion—purchase, reimbursement, clinical satisfaction, reorder—in both hospital and outpatient contexts. It generates concentrated word-of-mouth within tight geographic communities. And it creates compelling data for Series B fundraising: not scattered national pilots that prove interest, but deep market penetration that proves the full cycle works.

The Learning Curve of a Technical Founder

Mark’s candid about his inexperience with commercialization: “It’s something I’ve never done before is sell anything. So it’s, you know, we hire the team. We’ve got a very limited team because we’re only on our series a at the moment.”

For someone who spent 15 years in R&D and academia, the transition to commercial execution represents a fundamental shift. “That’s a different spotlight that I’m used to being under,” Mark admits when discussing the pressure to prove commercial traction.

This honesty is refreshing. Many technical founders pretend GTM will be obvious once the product is built. Mark acknowledges that building technology and selling it require entirely different skills—and that he’s learning the sales side in real-time while trying to prove both stakeholder maps work.

The Pressure of Dual Proof Points

What keeps Mark up at night isn’t technology—it’s proving the complete commercial motion works across both markets simultaneously. “Making sure that all of that happens is what’s keeping me up at night, especially at this point. We’re really trying the spotlights on us to perform.”

The challenge isn’t just that both markets have different stakeholder maps—it’s that Series B fundraising requires proving both work. Investors need to see that Epitel can navigate simple outpatient sales and complex hospital enterprise sales. That they can get reimbursed through multiple pathways. That both neurologists and emergency departments see value.

Proving one market works is hard. Proving two fundamentally different markets work simultaneously, with limited resources, while learning to sell for the first time, is the real test.

The Framework for Multi-Use-Case Sales

Epitel’s experience reveals principles for any company selling one product into multiple markets with different stakeholder maps:

Don’t assume your sales playbook transfers. The approach that works in one market—direct to single decision-maker—might require complete restructuring in another market with multiple stakeholders.

Identify stakeholder overlap as internal champion bridges. The neurologists who work in both settings become the credibility transfer mechanism between markets.

Sequence market entry strategically. Prove value in the simpler sale first, build champions, then leverage those relationships to navigate more complex stakeholder maps.

Define proof points that matter for both markets. Initial adoption proves willingness to try. Reorders prove the complete cycle works—clinical utility, patient satisfaction, operational fit, and economic viability.

Concentrate geography to prove depth over breadth. Dense penetration in two markets generates better Series B data than scattered pilots across ten markets.

The Takeaway

Four weeks into commercialization, Epitel faces a challenge that many multi-use-case companies eventually confront: proving that what works in one market actually transfers to another, even when stakeholder maps are completely different.

For founders building products that serve multiple use cases, the lesson is clear: your enterprise playbook might not work across all your markets. Each stakeholder map requires its own value proposition, proof points, and sales motion. The question isn’t whether you can sell—it’s whether you can sell the same product in fundamentally different ways simultaneously.

Mark is learning this in real-time. His honesty about the challenge—and his strategic approach to proving both markets work before scaling—offers a roadmap for other founders facing similar multi-stakeholder complexity.