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Civ Robotics: How Two Years of Engineering Work Almost Killed the Company

Tom Yeshurun spent $2 million on a surveying crew for a single construction project. Four people walked around the job site marking coordinates from blueprints—a process that felt absurdly outdated in 2017.

As a field engineer managing infrastructure projects worth $120 million to half a billion dollars, Tom used software called PlanGrid that put blueprints on a tablet. He imagined something better: “How awesome it would be if I could just select the area I want to draw and it will be drawn. Not calling the surveyor, not sending him an email. Do this, do that, just press a button and it’s done.”

That vision became Civ Robotics, a company now deploying autonomous ground robots across the United States, Australia, Europe, and the Middle East to automate construction layout.

But the path from vision to reality nearly ended before it began—because Tom made a critical mistake that cost his company two years of development.

When Engineering Preferences Override Market Validation

In a recent episode of BUILDERS, Tom shared the costly lesson that shaped Civ Robotics’ entire approach to product development. His engineering team decided to build the solution using an aerial drone. It was technically complex, intellectually stimulating, and exactly the kind of challenge engineers love to solve.

After two years of development, they finally put the prototype in front of potential customers.

The response was immediate: “We like the idea, we like what you’re doing, but we’re afraid of the drone. If it was a ground vehicle, we’ll probably take another look at it.”

Tom scrapped two years of work and rebuilt for ground vehicles.

The root cause was clear in retrospect: “If I would have brought this to potential customers up front in the beginning with the two options versus my engineering team to make that decision on their own based on their preference and excitement, because doing it with a drone is a lot more complex, maybe it would have been a different route. I would have started with the ground platform from the get go.”

But the mistake ran deeper than choosing the wrong form factor. Tom was also validating in the wrong market entirely.

The Israel-US Market Structure Gap

Tom was born and raised in Israel, so he interviewed companies in Israel and Europe during early development. But when he finally started talking to US companies—where his actual market was—he discovered fundamentally different market structures.

“In America, most of our customers do the surveying in-house as EPCs or general contractors, while in Israel we would sub it out to surveying firms.”

This wasn’t a minor detail. In Israel, even the biggest EPCs subcontract surveying work. In the US, EPCs like Bechtel and Primoris “bring that solution and service in house because they have enough volume and it’s an important task to be done.”

The buyer persona was completely different: in-house operations teams with P&L ownership versus procurement departments managing subcontractor relationships. The sales motion changed accordingly—internal ROI justification versus vendor selection criteria. The value proposition shifted from cost reduction to operational control and quality.

When Tom did interview American companies, “the feedback was pretty much immediately we like it. If it was on the ground would better.”

Two years building an aerial solution for a market that didn’t want it, validated with companies in regions where the customer profile didn’t even exist.

How Geographic Proximity Collapsed a Sales Cycle to One Week

Once Civ had the right product for the right market, Tom’s construction background became critical. “I don’t look at this as technology. I look at this as a tool and I speak the language. As a civil engineer and field engineer that was in their boots literally a few years prior… I can relate to them not as a sales rep, but as an industry colleague and speak their language and talk their pain points.”

But what actually closed deals was operational proof in similar conditions.

One of Civ’s biggest customers today started with the company’s fastest sales cycle. When Tom reached out, they asked: “Could it work in our terrain in the mud in Texas?”

Tom had done his preparation. He knew where their job site was located. His response: “Yeah, we have a robot like literally a mile away from you. It works just fine.”

The project was called Cutlass 1. The prospect’s project was Cutlass 2. Literally adjacent sites.

Wednesday call. Monday deployment. One month trial. Conversion to paying customer. Today: 15 robots deployed.

This pattern scales internationally. Civ now has 12 robots in Saudi Arabia with 15 more coming next year—without Tom ever visiting the country. The opportunity originated from a LinkedIn post where one of Civ’s customers shared content about the robots. A Saudi prospect commented asking about solar applications. The customer tagged Tom. Four months later: pilot deployed. Today: 12 robots operational.

The One-Two-Three Rule for Product Roadmaps

After nearly killing the company by building what engineers wanted instead of what customers needed, Tom implemented a rigid framework for product decisions:

“If a customer asks for a feature, we should write it down. If another customer asks it, we should probably start working it. If a third one asks it, we should have been done already.”

This eliminates building features that “product managers or software engineers that think this will be a cool feature.” Every development resource maps to customer requests—which map to revenue opportunities.

The discipline required is substantial. It means rejecting technically interesting problems that only one customer mentions. It means deferring innovation until the market validates demand. But it ensures Civ builds what customers will actually pay for, not what feels innovative internally.

Recruiting Construction Professionals Into Sales

As Civ scaled, Tom’s board asked how he’d duplicate himself as the company’s best seller.

His answer: “The best sales reps I’ve met in construction technology were construction people. Like people who work construction and left construction towards sales. As project managers and field engineers, you’re working a lot with people. So it’s very natural to have those skill sets of communication and approaches.”

The logic: construction project managers and field engineers already manage extensive stakeholder communication. They understand buyer constraints firsthand. They speak the industry’s language natively.

Tom contrasts this with marketing, where he hired a generalist. “Finding talent that worked on marketing, on construction automation, it’s a very small pool of people.” For marketing, domain knowledge is learnable. For customer-facing sales, it’s foundational.

The company is “grooming people that came from construction to become sales reps” while also recruiting construction engineers who want to transition into customer success and operations roles.

Structuring Reciprocal Value with Customer Amplifiers

One of Civ’s customers regularly posts professional-quality content about the robots. It differentiates him to his own clients and positions him as an early adopter of innovation. “He also wants to push the industry forward, so it’s a win for him. It’s also great marketing.”

Tom’s response to this customer: “Your subscription is coming up. I’ll cut it by half. Why? Because you’re a great influencer and helping us to spread the word. So I appreciate you.”

This isn’t a discount negotiation—it’s a structured value exchange. The customer benefits from enhanced market positioning. Civ benefits from credible third-party amplification. The specific ROI: this customer’s LinkedIn post generated the comment thread that led to 12 robots sold in Saudi Arabia.

Tom’s framing: “It is relationships and you know, this whole thing is relationships at the end of the day.”

Vision Grounded in Current Execution

Tom’s long-term vision includes machine guidance and full construction equipment autonomy. In five to ten years, he expects “less boots on the ground, even more while projects are becoming bigger” with “dirt being moved by machines without operators” and “materials distributed across the job site as well, without operators or maybe one overseeing five or 10 machines.”

But unlike the early aerial drone mistake, Tom isn’t chasing this vision at the expense of current customer needs. His advice to construction tech founders: “Solve a problem, solve it well and be customer driven. Don’t focus on a crazy bold vision that may come up or, you know, it’s really hard to grasp and feel and just focus on doing one thing really, really well so you can grow that to be bigger.”

The through-line across Civ’s journey: customer feedback over engineering preferences, target market validation over accessible markets, operational proof over abstract capabilities, and solving immediate problems over pursuing distant visions.

Two years of wasted development bought that clarity. Now it’s the operational foundation of everything Civ Robotics builds.